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Abstract 
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been in turmoil for more than six 
years. The present governance rules do not seem to solve the problemsneither permanently nor 
effectively. There is no vision about the future of Europe in the 21st century. This article 
describes a realignment of theeconomic governance, which do not necessarily lead to a transfer 
or political union. However, it solvesthe current and future challenges. In fact, theredesign of 
present rules is the most likely as well as legally and economically option today. The keyideais 
the detachment from the compulsive idea of an ever-closer union. However, this vision requires 
boldness towards greater flexibility together with an exit clauseor a state insolvency 
procedurefor incompliant member states. 
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1. Introduction 
Credibility and effective enforcement of the institutional framework is essential for lasting 
stability of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The legal ban of monetary financing 
(Article 123 TFEU) and the EU-regulation of the Stability and Growth Pact, the Six- & Two-
Pack, the European Semester and the Fiscal Treaty are all of particular importance in order to 
achieve stability. Nevertheless, the current rules are not sufficient to achieve stability in the end 
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due to legal inconsistencies and moral hazard. In general, there are two policy options to 
achieve stability in the future: Either the member states transfer decision-making powers to the 
European level, for example in form of a European fiscal and political union (Enderlein et al., 
2016).Or, alternatively, one reforms the presentrule-based approach so that member states have 
to make their budget decisions by their own and have responsibility for allfiscal consequences 
(Sinn 2016, Herzog 2016a). 
The rule-based approach (or so-called Maastricht philosophy) is the starting point for a reform 
of the European treaty. I propose to supplement the current institutional framework with either 
a state insolvency mechanism (SIM) or a credible no-bailoutclause according to article 125 
TFEU together with a new exit clause for incompliant states. Both policy options have the 
prerequisite that the rules and the rule-enforcement in the EMU is fully credible. In fact, an 
effective insolvency mechanism has several prerequisites (cf. section 2). The major difficulty is 
to incorporate the new insolvency mechanism into the legal system without creating moral 
hazard. Indeed, my proposal is closer to a state restructuring mechanism than an insolvency 
mechanism (Herzog 2016b).The following subsections outline the prerequisites for a stable and 
lasting future of the EMU. 
The first prerequisite of a state insolvency mechanism is the elimination of regulatory privilege 
of claims against states. Only this can mitigate a direct transfer of risks in the banking system to 
the state and vice versa. The regulatory de-privileging approach has two objectives: 
x Reducing the concentration of risks in bank balance sheets to prevent the insolvency of a 
single member state from rescuing insolvent banks such as during the financial crisis; 
x Increasing the loss absorption capacity of financial institutions, so that losses from state 
insolvencies could be better coped by banks. 
There are currently regulations in the European financial markets, which lead to a privilege of 
claims on states. Claims on non-governmental borrowers may not exceed 25 percent of eligible 
capital. This credit limit however does not apply to states! Moreover, there is no obligation to 
provide capital for claims against states in domestic currencies. Finally, marketable claims 
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against sovereign debtors in the area of liquidity regulation are considered as secure (so-called 
level 1 assets). In the case of non-governmental borrowers, the regulatory law demands 
reductions and upper bounds. 
Based on stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority (EBA), the German Council 
of Economic Experts carried out calculations to illustrate the effects of a reform of the 
financialregulatory privilege of states (SVR 2015, Chapter 5). The results show a clear 
heterogeneity across countries as well as a home bias, particularly in southern periphery 
countries and in Germany. The German Council argues for an introduction of credit limits to all 
government claims. These limits should vary with the risk because concentration risks in bank 
balance sheets pose a risk to the financial system as whole, especially in case of default. 
Independent rating agenciesregularly evaluate the default risk beyond political influence. For 
the low-rated member countries, the Council proposes a credit limit as for corporate loans of 25 
percent in relation to eligible capital. The credit limit is incrementally increasing for countries 
with better credit ratings. The valuesare similar to the Basel risk-weights. In addition, there is a 
need for higher capitalratios for banks in Europe. Scientific studies call for an increase to 
approximately 20 percentin the equity ratio(Admati and Hellwig 2013). Aftera phase-in period 
of over 10 years, credit limits and the higher equity ratios are binding. The relevant closing date 
has to be in the past in order to exclude the purchase of privileged bonds, in order to bypass the 
new regulation. 
The second prerequisite is a significant reduction of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. In line with 
the first prerequisite and according to the Maastricht Treaty,member states debt is limitedto 60 
per cent in relation to gross domestic product (GDP). There is a long debate on this issue, 
however without any lasting action(SVR 2011, paragraph 242 ff., SVR 2013, paragraph 276 ff). 
In fact, the German Council concludes that the "high debt of the member states (...) prevents the 
introduction of an insolvency mechanisms at present time" (SVR 2015, point 87 ff). Moreover, some 
solutions for this problem are no longer accessible due to the incompatibility with the current 
institutional structure. I propose a new solution for this problem without establishing a fiscal 
capacity or a  debt-sharing mechanism (SVR 2016, paragraph 57).If and only if these 
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prerequisites are in place, we can start to reform and redesign the EMU with either an 
insolvency mechanism or an exit clause. 
2. Steps towards a State Insolvency Mechanism in the EMU 
A state insolvency mechanism (SIM) should establish a rule-based structure, so that an 
insolvency can be carried out quasi-automatically along certain milestones. Hence, the SIMis 
largely deprived of the political negotiation process. On the one hand,this is reducing the 
uncertainty. On the other hand,it helps market participantsto formcredible expectations. A 
further building block of an insolvency regulation is a provision that ensures the equal 
treatment of creditors. This helps to reduce both a ‘rush to the exit’ and the ‘holdout problem’. 
 
2.1 SIM applies only if the default is not the ‘fault’ of member states 
Financial assistance from soundmember states istheoretically completely unnecessary if we 
have a credible no-bailout clause. However, there are debt crises, which are not directly caused 
by domestic policy errors. For example, member states may be in a financial crisis because of 
systemic risks that put the national banking system on the brink of collapse. Or evenmore 
importantly if there are regionally concentrated industries that are hit by new competitors from 
emerging economies. Of course, the domestic reaction and adjustmentto exogenous shocks is 
often delayedbecause it requires unpopular structural reforms (Smaghi 2014). It is not always 
easy to determine which factor – exogenous shock or wrong economic policy – dominates. 
However, a state insolvency mechanism in the euro area has to be contingent on extraordinary 
cases because of the inherent moral hazard thatis even amplifiedin the monetary union 
(Beetsma and Bovernberg 1999, 2000, 2003, Beetsma and Uhlig 1999, Dixit and Lambertini 2003, 
Herzog 2004, 2016b). As a result, the principle of self-responsibility and no-bailout (especially 
inhomemade crises) have to be the gold standard. In so doing, the onset of the SIM for an 
indebted country is contingent on the compliance of all its legal obligations –existing rules. If 
the country is not able to solve the crisisby their own, despite of structural reforms and 
austerity measures, conditional rescue funds are available such as the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM). 
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2.2 The Use of SIMs Must Be Unattractive 
In order to mitigate moral hazard, the SIM must be unattractive. In fact, the SIMcould be seen 
as a lender-of-last-help. There are different options to implement this disincentive. Ultimately, 
it is about the loss ofbudgetary autonomy for countries under the SIM. An extremeform of such 
an intervention would be a state insolvency administrator, e.g. a European Finance Minister. 
The impending loss of the budgetary autonomy could foster financial discipline ex ante. This 
has similar effects as an exit clause as an alternative proposal to a state insolvency mechanism. 
The disincentive effect is manifold. First, there would be a considerable loss of prestige for the 
national politicians. Secondly, there would be the danger of losing regional and cultural 
identity. In the case of economically weak and politicallyunsound member states, this could 
promote the preference of a voluntary exit from the monetary union. For this reason, the 
possibility of a self-determined voluntary exit has to be legislated in a SIM as well. In case of 
lasting policy failures ora sustained incompliance with European rules,member countries must 
exit the EMUin order to achieve the necessary credibility of common rules (ie, a credible 
threat!). Sinn (2016) labels this idea a ‘breathing currency union’. 
A less radical option would be to suspend only the financial autonomy or at least the autonomy 
of the expenditure side during the period of crises. However, this would require EU 
competencies to enforce the national budgetlaw (Calliess 2017). For this purpose, the 
competencies of the EU-Commission has to be strengthened under an SIM. For example, if 
spending cuts are possible but the governmenthas not yet implemented the cutsbecause they 
are unpopular, then the EU-Commissionhas the legal rights to enforcethe necessary steps. 
However, such a regulation could make it attractive for governments to delay unpopular 
structural reforms until the EU-Commission is doing the ugly jobs. 
3. Conclusion 
No doubt, a state insolvency mechanism (SIM) in the EMU is no silver bullet. Of course, it 
would reduce the risk premiumfor the heavily indebted member states butat the same time 
offer an incentive to be less sustainable. Indeed, there is the risk that the highly indebted states 
today hope to get rid of their debts tomorrow by the new insolvency mechanism. In order to 
eliminate theseconsiderable moral hazard incentives, the implementation of a state insolvency 
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mechanism (SIM) can only work under the strong requirements. Admittedly, a SIM constraints 
national sovereignty but only for indebted countries that are incompliant to the commonly 
agreed rules. 
If one wants to stabilize the EMU without the potential disputes in the course of a European 
insolvency mechanism, there is only one other alternative: the inclusion of an automatic exit 
clause for incompliant member states. Only this has the same disciplinary action on heavily 
indebted and incompliant member countries in the EMU. From a sober point of view, currently 
there is no ‘no-bailout’ in the euro area, since the policy practicehas been a bailout of indebted 
countries such as Greece. In short: without a credible NO-BAILOUT clause, i.e.either an 
effective insolvency regime or an exit clause, the stability and soundness of the European 
monetary union remains in question. 
References 
Admati, A. und M. Hellwig (2013), Des Bankers Neue Kleider, FBV Verlag, München. 
Beetsma, R.M. and A.L. Bovernberg (1999). Does Monetary Unification Lead to Excessive Debt 
Accumulation?. Journal of Public Economics, 74(3): 299–325.  
Beetsma, R.M. and A.L. Bovernberg (2000). Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a Monetary 
Union. Public Choice, 102(3–4): 247–69. 
Beetsma, R.M. and A.L. Bovernberg (2003). Strategic Debt Accumulation in a Heterogeneous Monetary 
Union. European Journal of Political Economy, 19(1): 1–15. 
Beetsma, R.M. and H. Uhlig (1999). An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact. Economic Journal, 
109(458): 546–71.  
Calliess, C. (2017), Durchgriffsrechte in die nationale Haushaltsautonomie, Reflexionsgruppe, 
Diskussionpapier, Konrand-Adenauer-Stiftung. 
Dixit, A. and L. Lambertini (2003). Symbiosis of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union. 
Journal of International Economics, 60(2): 235–47. 
Enderlein, H. et al. (2016), Repair and Prepare: Der Euro und Wachstum nach dem Brexit, Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, Gütersloh. 
Herzog, B. (2016a), Neujustierung der Governance der Europäischen Währungsunion, p. 1-46, Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin, ISBN 978-3-95721-206-1. 
 
 
68 
 
Herzog, B. (2016b), Modelling Monetary and Fiscal Governance in the Wake of the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
in Europe, Economies, 4(2), 9. doi:10.3390/economies4020009 
Herzog, B. (2010), Anwendung des Nachhaltigkeitsansatzes von Bohn zur Etablierung eines 
Frühindikators in den öffentlichen Finanzen – Beitrag zur aktuellen Debatte der 
Föderalismuskommission II, Journal of Credit and Capital, 43. Jahrgang, Heft 2, S. 1-24. 
Herzog, B. (2004). Warum verstoßen vorwiegend die großen EWU-Länder gegen den “Stabilitäts- und 
Wachstumspakt“?. Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, 73(3): 405-417. 
Perotti, R. (2014), Fiscal Policies in Recessions, ?, in: What have we learned? Macroeconomic Policy after 
the Crisis, eds. G. Akerlof, O. Blanchard, D. Romer and J. Stigilizt, MIT Press. 
Sinn, H.-W. (2016), Der schwarze Juni, Herder, Freiburg. 
Smaghi, L.B. (2014), Monetary Policy, the Only Game in Town?, in: What have we learned? 
Macroeconomic Policy after the Crisis, eds. G. Akerlof, O. Blanchard, D. Romer and J. Stigilizt, MIT Press. 
SVR (2016), Jahresgutachten 2016, Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung, Wiesbaden. 
SVR (2015), Jahresgutachten 2015, Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung, Wiesbaden. 
SVR (2013), Jahresgutachten 2013, Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung, Wiesbaden. 
SVR (2011), Jahresgutachten 2011, Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung, Wiesbaden. 
(Version: April 2017) 
***** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
